debian-forge-composer/.github/workflows
Ondřej Budai 3561202acc github: prevent script injections via PR branch names
Prior this commit, ${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_branch }} got
expanded in the bash script. A malicious actor could inject
an arbitrary shell script. Since this action has access to a token
with write rights the malicious actor can easily steal this token.

This commit moves the expansion into an env block where such an
injection cannot happen. This is the preferred way according to the
github docs:
https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-guides/security-hardening-for-github-actions#using-an-intermediate-environment-variable
2024-12-05 18:13:17 +01:00
..
coverity_scan.yml build(deps): bump actions/checkout from 3 to 4 2023-09-22 10:19:39 +02:00
create-tag.yml Update create-tag.yml 2023-06-30 16:39:25 +02:00
pr_best_practices.yml ci: add a PR best practices check 2024-03-07 19:46:11 +01:00
release.yml release-action: Send notification to our Slack channel 2021-12-13 09:48:34 +01:00
stale-cleanup.yml Actions: add workflow for marking and closing stale issues and PRs 2023-09-07 13:10:48 +02:00
tests.yml github/workflows/tests: add dependency for tests 2024-11-19 13:55:38 +01:00
trigger-gitlab.yml github: prevent script injections via PR branch names 2024-12-05 18:13:17 +01:00