Fix security vulnerabilities

Ran `npm audit fix`.

Even though this fixes a "high" severity vulnerability, all affected
packages are dev packages only.

node_modules/lodash/template.js

@@ -10,11 +10,26 @@ var assignInWith = require('./assignInWith'),
     templateSettings = require('./templateSettings'),
     toString = require('./toString');
 
+/** Error message constants. */
+var INVALID_TEMPL_VAR_ERROR_TEXT = 'Invalid `variable` option passed into `_.template`';
+
 /** Used to match empty string literals in compiled template source. */
 var reEmptyStringLeading = /\b__p \+= '';/g,
     reEmptyStringMiddle = /\b(__p \+=) '' \+/g,
     reEmptyStringTrailing = /(__e\(.*?\)|\b__t\)) \+\n'';/g;
 
+/**
+ * Used to validate the `validate` option in `_.template` variable.
+ *
+ * Forbids characters which could potentially change the meaning of the function argument definition:
+ * - "()," (modification of function parameters)
+ * - "=" (default value)
+ * - "[]{}" (destructuring of function parameters)
+ * - "/" (beginning of a comment)
+ * - whitespace
+ */
+var reForbiddenIdentifierChars = /[()=,{}\[\]\/\s]/;
+
 /**
  * Used to match
  * [ES template delimiters](http://ecma-international.org/ecma-262/7.0/#sec-template-literal-lexical-components).
@@ -169,11 +184,11 @@ function template(string, options, guard) {
 
   // Use a sourceURL for easier debugging.
   // The sourceURL gets injected into the source that's eval-ed, so be careful
-  // with lookup (in case of e.g. prototype pollution), and strip newlines if any.
-  // A newline wouldn't be a valid sourceURL anyway, and it'd enable code injection.
+  // to normalize all kinds of whitespace, so e.g. newlines (and unicode versions of it) can't sneak in
+  // and escape the comment, thus injecting code that gets evaled.
   var sourceURL = hasOwnProperty.call(options, 'sourceURL')
     ? ('//# sourceURL=' +
-       (options.sourceURL + '').replace(/[\r\n]/g, ' ') +
+       (options.sourceURL + '').replace(/\s/g, ' ') +
        '\n')
     : '';
 
@@ -206,12 +221,16 @@ function template(string, options, guard) {
 
   // If `variable` is not specified wrap a with-statement around the generated
   // code to add the data object to the top of the scope chain.
-  // Like with sourceURL, we take care to not check the option's prototype,
-  // as this configuration is a code injection vector.
   var variable = hasOwnProperty.call(options, 'variable') && options.variable;
   if (!variable) {
     source = 'with (obj) {\n' + source + '\n}\n';
   }
+  // Throw an error if a forbidden character was found in `variable`, to prevent
+  // potential command injection attacks.
+  else if (reForbiddenIdentifierChars.test(variable)) {
+    throw new Error(INVALID_TEMPL_VAR_ERROR_TEXT);
+  }
+
   // Cleanup code by stripping empty strings.
   source = (isEvaluating ? source.replace(reEmptyStringLeading, '') : source)
     .replace(reEmptyStringMiddle, '$1')